Objective. Our study seeks to understand the role of perceived economic stress of the Great Recession on political participation among blacks, whites and Latinos. Methods. We use Overall, we conclude that the Great Recession did affect political behavior but differently across race and ethnic groups; specifically, Hispanics were least likely to politically engage if they experienced negative consequences of the Great Recession.
1

Introduction
The recent economic downturn of [2008] [2009] , the Great Recession, had a profound impact on the lives of many Americans.
With unemployment rates reaching as high as 16% for some subgroups and the number of homes lost to foreclosure reaching about 5 million, it is easy to suggest the immense impact the recession had on millions of Americans (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010; Bocian et al., 2012) . While the Great Recession significantly impacted the economic prospects for many Americans, the outcomes were disproportionately felt by communities of color and immigrants across the country (Jones, 2009; Reece and Gambhir, 2008; Taylor et al., 2011) .
Disproportionate increases in unemployment among blacks and
Hispanics (Applied Research Center, 2009; Rivera et al., 2009; Weller, Fields, and Agbede, 2011) against the backdrop of lower overall savings and accumulated wealth left many families of color struggling in their daily lives (Berndt and James, 2009 ).
Moreover, the economic recession had a marked impact on how the electorate views government and political institutions, with approval ratings for Congress reaching all-time lows driven largely by the perceived inability of the federal government to 4 reverse the downward spiral of the economy (Gallup, 2013) .
Public attitudes toward government and political institutions are critical, as these psychological attitudes impact outcomes such as interest in politics and political participation.
The focus of our study is to understand the role of perceived economic stress of the Great Recession on political participation across race and ethnic groups; we link our respondents' financial hardship during the Great Recession to their political participation. We use the 2012 Collaborative Multi-Racial Political Study to examine our primary hypothesis that financial hardship of the Great Recession will influence the political participation of race and ethnic groups differently according to available resources.
Resources and Political Engagement
The Great Recession provides an opportunity to further understand the long-standing relationship between resources and political engagement. Resource mobilization theory emphasizes the importance of resources for an engaged civic life and the availability of resources for political engagement (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995) . Individuals with greater resources, both material and psychological, are better able engage in the political sphere (Garcia Bedolla and Michelson, 2012) . Multiple types of resources impact an individual's level of political 5 engagement (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995) , the foremost of which is socio-economic status (Logan, Darrah, and Oh, 2012; Verba et al., 1993; Nagler 1992a, 1992b; Leighley, 1990; Nie et al., 1988; Nagel, 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Verba and Nie, 1972) . While educational attainment and income are salient resources for political participation, scholars have found that other resources such as interest and attitudes about government (Aldrich, 1993; Teixeira, 1992; Conway, 1991, Abramson and Aldrich, 1982) , residential stability (Estrada-Correa & Johnson, 2011) and group consciousness (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Shingles, 1981) also affect political participation. Though a significant body of research underpins the resource model, several expansion opportunities still exist, a task to which we now turn.
The Retrospective Resource Model
According to traditional resource theory, as an individual's resources decline, so too does his/her political participation. Through the lens of the economic recession, we expand upon the traditional resource model through considering resource accumulation changes based on outside forces such as the Great Recession and argue the changes will modify levels of political participation. One way of determining economic stress and resource change is through individual retrospective 6 evaluation of personal economic status-retrospection as the process of looking backwards to assess resources in a comparative and cross-sectional manner (e.g. pre-Recession and post-Recession). Traditional resource theory implies that there are a plurality of resources that affect participation.
Political participants acknowledge that resources, such as income, are subject to change, and in turn, act in accordance with those changes in the political sphere.
During the Great Recession, the nation saw high foreclosure rates (Estrada-Correa and Johnson, 2012; Ramirez, 2007; Cho and Gimpel, 2009 ). Moreover, many families moved locally to find affordable housing. Residential mobility along with high foreclosure rates is associated with reduced political participation and consequences for social connectivity (Fesselmeyer, Le, and Ying, 2013; Stoll, 2013; Allen, 2011; Highton, 2000 Estrada-Correa and Johnson, 2012; but see Gimpel 2009 ). We expect that an individual's level of participation is not only determined by current income, but upon how financially stable the individual feels s/he is, in comparison to the past.
The Retrospective Resource Model and Race/Ethnicity
Against the backdrop of our Retrospective Resource Model, we consider the effects of the Great Recession on racial and 7 ethnic political participation disparities. Given the fluidity of resource accumulation following the Great Recession, effect of resource change on racial and ethnic groups and implications for political participation is less than clear. The Great Recession affected communities of color most adversely. For example, racial and ethnic minorities disproportionately felt the social disruption from home loss (Fesselmeyer, Le and Ying, 2013; Bocian, Li and Ernst, 2008 (Bocian et al., 2012) . In studies of residential mobility prior to the recession, higher residential mobility has been found to contribute to relatively lower voter turnout rates among Latinos (Ramirez, 2007) .
Prior to the Great Recession, racial and ethnic minority groups already displayed disproportionate shares of financial stress as compared to white Americans. In addition, we know that prior to the Great Recession whites demonstrated higher levels of political engagement than blacks and Latinos, and Latinos had the lowest level of political engagement (Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Leighley, 2001; Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet, 1989) . When the economic recession hit, many blacks and Latinos lacked financial safety-nets, and given their 8 already stressed financial situation, they were unable to "hangon" through the storm. Hence this is why we saw that the Great Recession had a disproportionate impact on minority holdings:
Hispanic median household wealth fell 66% between 2005 and 2009 compared to a 53% fall for black households, compared to only 16% for white households (Cheney-Rice 2014). Moreover, housing accounts for 49% of black wealth compared to 28% wealth for the average white household. Thus, when we see that people of color lost their homes at a higher rate than whites during the recession (Bocian et al., 2012) and that their wealth was linked to home ownership, then we see why people of color had more financial stress during the Great Recession. Therefore, the impact of the Great Recession on resources among racial and ethnic minority groups will not be of equal magnitude and in turn its impact on political participation will not be of equal magnitude either.
However, research has uncovered protective resources among blacks: group consciousness and linked fate (Dawson, 1994) . The black community has a long history of organizing to overcome threats against the community as a whole (Shingles, 1981) .
Blacks, more so than other groups, tend to have a sense of belonging with other members of their community and tend to believe that what happens to others in your group will also 9 affect the individual (Dawson, 1994; Hardy-Fanta, 1993) . Given these protective forces, we expect that in times of hardship (e.g. financial stress due to the Great Recession) the black community will be more likely to mobilize rather than disengage, leading us to our first hypothesis:
H1. Blacks with a stronger linked fate will be mobilized to engage politically by financial hardship suffered in the past 12 months.
Conversely, while Latinos' political participation has increased over time, their rates of participation have been consistently lower than all other racial and ethnic minority groups (Uhlaner and Garcia, 1998; Wong, 2000) . This is not surprising given that Latinos tend to have lower socio-economic status than whites, but also lack the high levels of group consciousness of the black community (Sanchez and Masuoka, 2010) . Given that Latinos were disproportionately affected by the Great Recession and they lack strong protective resources such as group consciousness and linked fate, we expect that they are likely to disengage politically.
H2. Latinos will decrease their political participation if they experience a bad financial situation in the past 12 months.
In comparison to blacks and Latinos, whites were not as adversely affected by the Great Recession. Therefore, we argue 10 that whites begin with a diverse set of resources, and as a result their participation will be less likely to decrease. In addition to retaining a greater number of resources during the recession, whites also have political socialization skills and therefore are likely to continue established habitual participation patterns. Therefore, we do not expect a significant effect of the recession on whites' political behavior: Other Independent Variables. In addition to our key independent variables, we include several control variables; please see the Technical Appendix for these variables.
H3. Whites will not see any impact of the recession on their political activity.
Data and Methods
Data and
Analytic Plan
After exploring the bivariate relationships between personal financial indicators and income, we conduct a series of multivariate analyses. Due to evidence of significant overdispersion in the sample as a whole (G 2 =583.89, p<.0001), we employ negative binomial regression with clustering at the state level to predict individual-level respondent political participation in 2012 (Cameron and Trividi, 1998; Long and Freese, 2006; Tseloni, 1999) . We also make use of survey weights in each of the models, the post-stratification adjustment was applied based on demographic distributions from the most recent Current Population Survey. across all race/ethnic groups, reporting a negative financial situation is associated with a higher number of political acts.
[Insert Table 3 One cannot assume that a decrease in resources will result in a decrease in political participation.
As expected, we find that financial stress mobilizes black political participation and a high level of linked fate seems to have a protective role. We should note that black political engagement remains high even after controlling for Great (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010) , coupled with their preceding low levels of political participation and high levels of financial stress, it is not surprising that we find they had low levels of political participation. Finally, since whites have pre-existing high levels of political socialization and participation, combined with the fact that they were not hard hit by the Great Recession, this led to their political participation being relatively unaffected. This study shows that we are not a monolithic nation and we cannot expect communities to react to financial stressors in the same manner.
As economic inequity increases in the U.S. it is even more critical to continue to examine financial stress and how it affects communities differently. We find for Latinos, it can be dangerous, as financial stress is leading to low levels of political participation. In a democratic society we all want to strive for equality in participation. Here we are seeing that financial stress can lead to increased inequity in political participation, and if this inequity persists it may further threaten our ideal of an egalitarian democracy. 
